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Abstract. The work in this paper1 is devoted to the definition of a dependability
modeling and model based evaluation approach based on UML models. It is to
be used in the early phases of the system design to capture system dependability
attributes like reliability and availability, thus providing guidelines for the
choice among different architectural and design solutions. We show how
structural UML diagrams can be processed to filter out the dependability related
information and how a system-wide dependability model is constructed. Due to
the modular construction, this model can be refined later as more detailed in-
formation becomes available. We discuss the model refinement based on the
General Resource Model, an extension of UML. We show that the dependabil-
ity model can be constructed automatically by using graph transformation tech-
niques.
1 Introduction
Standardized design methods and tools are available for the designers of complex
computer systems in order to increase the effectiveness of the design. UML (Unified
Modeling Language [26]), UML based methods and CASE (Computer-Aided Soft-
ware Engineering) tools are widely used for the design of various systems from small
embedded controllers to large information infrastructures.
An effective design process should include an early validation of the architectural
choices and concepts underlying the design. The more earlier the bottlenecks and in-
sufficiencies are highlighted, the less is the loss due to the necessary corrections and
re-design. Dependability is among the properties to be validated during the system
design, especially in the case of critical systems.
Our earlier ESPRIT project HIDE2 aimed at the creation of an integrated design
environment that augmented UML based design tools with mathematical analysis
techniques [7]. Model based dependability evaluation was supported by elaboration of
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an automatic transformation from UML diagrams to Timed Petri Nets (TPN) that
could be solved by off-the-shelf analysis tools to get reliability and availability attrib-
utes of the system under design. This transformation, together with its extensions and
implementation techniques elaborated since that time are the subjects of our paper.
The idea of translating design models into reliability models can be found in sev-
eral papers.  [13] converts UML models to dynamic fault trees. However, in this work
the basis of the translation is not the functional design since UML is used mainly as a
language to describe error propagation and module substitution. Here also a translator
is reported that converts UML descriptions into reliability block diagrams. Similarly,
OpenSESAME [34] uses high-level (graphical) diagrams to express dependencies,
error propagation and redundancy structure. In this case analysis of availability is per-
formed by a transformation to Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets. In [18], Markov
chains are used to derive reliability of middleware architectures described in extended
UML.
In our transformation we applied a modular and hierarchical approach. In the early
architectural design phase the relevant information is captured from UML structural
views and a system-wide dependability model is constructed. Here we use UML as a
standard architecture description language (note that our method can be adapted to
other architectural languages as well). The critical parts of the model (as shown by the
analysis) are extended as the design gets refined and relevant information becomes
available. These ideas are also widely accepted in the related literature. It is agreed
that architecture evaluation based on analytical dependability modeling deserves at-
tention in the early design phase [14], the modeling approach should be modular [22]
and the model should be refined hierarchically as the design includes more and more
information [4]. It is observed that the separation of architectural and service concerns
allows the dependability analysis from the perspective of different users [29].
The paper is organized as follows. Sect. 2 motivates the model based dependability
analysis. Sect. 3 introduces the design conventions and the extensions necessary to
include local dependability related parameters in the early phases of the design. Sect.
4 describes the model transformation from the structural view of UML to the TPN
dependability model. Sect. 5 discusses the ways of model refinement concentrating
especially on the modeling of resources and faults related to the resources. Sect. 6
presents how the model transformation is implemented while Sect. 7 provides assess-
ment of the approach. Sect. 8 concludes the paper.
2 Dependability Modeling and Analysis
This section motivates the need for model-based dependability evaluation, gives the
rationale of dependability modeling and introduces a hierarchical and modular mod-
eling approach.
2.1 Purpose of the Model Based Dependability Analysis
Evaluation of availability and reliability (two attributes of system dependability as
defined in [19]) is necessary to assess whether the system being developed satisfies its
targets. Analytical modeling has proven to be useful and versatile to evaluate these
attributes in the design phase. Dependability models allow comparing different archi-
tectural solutions and design choices and to run sensitivity analysis identifying both
dependability bottlenecks and critical parameters to which the system is sensitive.
In our approach, dependability modeling is to be performed in addition to the ar-
chitectural design based on the extensions of the architectural model of the target sys-
tem by the parameters needed for the analysis. This approach avoids to build a de-
pendability model from scratch, thus the consistency between the designers' model and
the dependability model is guaranteed by the process.
2.2 Components of a Dependability Model
The abstraction of a dependability model consists of the following general parts:
-  Fault activation processes, which model the fault occurrences in basic system
components (especially physical resources).
-  Propagation processes, which model the consequences of fault occurrences and
result in derived failure events. E.g. a failure of a network card results in the failure
of an information retrieval service.
-  Repair processes, which model how basic or derived events are removed from the
system. Repair can be implemented by fault treatment and/or error recovery de-
pending on the type of the component.
-  Mapping from architectural level to service level, which gives how the failures of
software and/or hardware components and subsystems result in the failure of a sys-
tem service (as observable by the user). Different mappings can be used to take into
account different service needs (ways of usage).
The fault activation processes are determined by environmental conditions, and
physical or computational properties of the elements of the system. The propagation
processes are influenced by the structure of the system (e.g. interactions, redundancy,
and fault tolerance schemes). The repair processes are determined by the (physical or)
computational policy implemented in the system.
2.3 Formalisms and Tools for Dependability Analysis
Among the various formalisms and tools developed for dependability modeling and
analysis, Petri nets have been widely accepted because of their expressiveness and
powerful solution techniques. Timed and stochastic extensions of Petri nets encom-
pass the class of Generalised Stochastic Petri Nets  (GSPN) [2], Deterministic and
Stochastic Petri Nets (DSPN) [1] and Markov Regenerative Stochastic Petri Nets
(MRSPN) [9]. Many automated tools based on Petri nets are available, e.g. UltraSAN
[30], PANDA [3], GreatSPN [8], SPNP [10], SURF2 [31]. In certain cases (e.g. ex-
ponential transition firing times) analytic solution is possible, otherwise simulation has
to be performed.
2.4 Mastering Complexity
Dependability modeling and analysis of complex systems pose serious problems due
to the complexity of the dependability model, which may be out of the range existing
tools can deal with. This complexity is due to the large number of components as well
as the complex interactions among (redundant) hardware and software entities.
Small systems can be analyzed by modeling the behavior at a fine granularity, e.g.
at UML statechart level. However, as the complexity of the system increases, another
approach has to be followed. Modular modeling and hierarchic refinement of a rough
(structural) dependability model are typical ways of mastering complexity. First only
the relevant aspects of the system are modeled and analyzed, which enables the com-
putation of numerical results and at the same time allows the estimation of the sensi-
tivity of system-level attributes to the parameters of specific components. In this way
those components and design decisions can be identified that need a refined analysis.
Modular modeling allows replacing components of a rough dependability model with
more detailed ones.
In our approach, first we build a quite abstract model, which concentrates on the
structure of the system and, accordingly, takes information from the structural UML
diagrams. It has the following advantages:
-  It results in a system-wide (but less detailed) representation of the dependability
characteristics of the system in its entirety.
-  The size of the model and thus the time and resource needs of the analysis can be
controlled.
-  Preliminary evaluations of the system dependability during the early phases of the
design can be provided. Usually, the structural UML models, that is the class, ob-
ject, and deployment diagrams, are available before the detailed low level ones, and
the analysis on models derived from the structural view provides indications about
the critical parts of the system that require a more detailed representation.
By using appropriate interfaces, the structural dependability models can be aug-
mented by inserting more detailed information coming from refined UML models of
the identified critical parts of the system. This way we can deal with various levels of
details ranging from very preliminary abstract UML descriptions up to the refined
specifications of the last design phases.
Accordingly, dependability modeling and analysis can be performed in several
steps. The first step has the fundamental task of extracting the relevant dependability
information from the mass of information available in the UML description. In this
step, the structural dependability model is built, in which we can fix the fault activa-
tion, error propagation and repair processes as well as the mapping to the service
level. The dependability model is formalized by a Timed Petri Net (TPN) that can be
translated to the input format of the specific Petri net tool selected for performing the
analysis.
The subsequent steps can refine the structural model by replacing modules of the
structural dependability model (i.e. the corresponding TPN) with sub-models con-
structed on the basis of the refined UML models (e.g. also behavioral diagrams like
statecharts and message sequence charts that describe the interaction of components
more precisely. For the purpose of this sub-model construction, other methods of
processing UML diagrams are provided (Section 5).
In this paper we will show the construction of the structural dependability model,
identify the interfaces to extend this model and make reference to approaches avail-
able to construct the refined sub-models.
2.5 Model Parameters and Validation of the Dependability Model
Dependability modeling - especially in the case of rough structural models constructed
in the early design phases - should be based on a number of assumptions and simplifi-
cations. Since the assumptions and simplifying hypotheses may lead to wrong ap-
proximation of the system behavior, the resulting error should always be estimated
either through sensitivity analysis or by comparing the results obtained by the model
containing the assumption and by a model where it has been released.
Another problem is that models need many (aggregate) parameters whose meaning
is not always intuitive for the designers. Obviously, values for such parameters may be
difficult to provide in early phases of design. The ideal source would be to provide
them through experimental tests on prototypes (unlikely to be available). Alternatives
are data from similar systems (modules) or data derived from designers' experience.
Experimental results have to be provided at later stages to validate the numerical
results gained by the solution of the dependability model. It has however to be empha-
sized that instead of the concrete numerical dependability measures, the outcomes of
the sensitivity analysis and the comparison of design choices are the most beneficial
results of a model based dependability evaluation.
3 System Modeling in the Early Phases of Design
In the early phases of the design we assume that an architectural description of the
system is available. The software architecture is specified by class, object and collabo-
ration diagrams. The allocation of the software elements to hardware units and re-
sources is described by static deployment diagrams, no dynamic resource utilization is
specified. The dependability-related attributes of components are aggregate ones that
combine performance-related and dependability-related attributes (like component
activation probability and error detection coverage are aggregated to error propagation
probability).
In the subsequent design steps the model of the system is to be refined. From the
point of view of the dependability modeling, the management of redundancy and the
specification of dynamic resource usage play a crucial role. Accordingly, more refined
UML models are assumed that separate usage (conformant with the corresponding
UML resource modeling profile [25]) and fault activation/error propagation. The as-
pects of this kind of model refinement are detailed in Sect. 5.
3.1 Attributes of the System and its Components
The system-level dependability attributes, i.e. availability and reliability are computed
by the solution of the dependability model based on the local dependability attributes
of the various components of the system. In the abstract structural model, the local
(aggregate) attributes of basic components are values characterizing fault activation,
error propagation and repair processes (Sect. 2.2) as follows:
-  Fault activation is characterized by the fault occurrence (random variable repre-
senting the time needed for the activation of a fault), the error latency (random
variable representing the time needed to bring the component to a failure after the
fault generates an erroneous internal state) and the ratio of permanent and transient
faults. Naturally, in stateless (purely functional) components there is no error la-
tency, while in software components only permanent (design) faults occur.
-  Error propagation is characterized by the error propagation probability which is
assigned to a pair of interconnected components whenever the failure of a server-
like component results in the failure of the another, client-like component. Two
components can be connected in terms of failure propagation bi-directionally if any
one of them may influence the failure of the other component. In this case error
propagation probability is assigned in both directions.
-  Repair is characterized by the repair delay (random variable representing the time
needed to perform the repair). Note that error propagation prescribes a constraint
for the repair of a component: the repair of a component can not be completed until
all the used components are fully operational.
-  Mapping from architecture to service levels is characterized typically by Boolean
logic expressions describing what combinations of component failures can consti-
tute the failure of the service. These combinations are visualized by a fault tree.
The structure of this dependability model is inspired by the approach presented in
[20]. We have slightly modified that model: we use a more reduced hierarchy and, for
the sake of convenience, we distinguish between stateless and stateful components.
The distinction between them is important from the point of view of the potential er-
roneous state, error latency and propagation. Similarly, the distinction of hardware
components is necessary from the point of view of the transient faults.
As it partially turns out from the above set of relevant attributes, we have intro-
duced a set of general assumptions for the dependability model:
-  Solid software failures are not taken into account (assuming that they were removed
before execution by a thorough debugging and fault removal).
-  There are no failures that compensate the effects of other ones.
-  “Repair” is implicit if the fault disappears after activation (transient hardware faults
and all software faults). Repair of a derived failure is implicit if it disappears as
soon as the underlying faults and failures have been repaired.
-  Explicit repair refers to the actions that are planned and scheduled by the designer.
Explicit repair may remove (permanent) faults from the system or restore the serv-
ice of system components.
In the following we detail the restrictions to be imposed on the UML designer to
allow translating the specification into a dependability model. These restrictions are
mainly related to the introduction of redundancy into the system, for which particular
structures are to be utilized to permit the identification of the crucial points. Since the
information on dependability aspects is typically not included into a UML design, we
prescribe a set of extensions of the standard UML in order to create controlled inter-
face towards the designer for the input of parameters, the selection of desired meas-
ures, and the choice of the fault-tolerance structures to be included into the system.
3.2 Redundancy Structures
One fundamental choice has been made in defining the way redundancy has to be ex-
pressed in the UML design. We opted for the so called “class based“ redundancy
which prescribes that elements of a redundancy structure must be defined as instances
of specific classes (based on templates and stereotypes) [35]. It is important to notice
that this choice supports the use of design patterns collected in a fault-tolerance li-
brary. Moreover, the construction of such library can be integrated with the depend-
ability modeling in the sense that it will be possible to associate to the elements of the
library their dependability sub-models which will be derived only once, thus building
at the same time a library of dependability sub-models.
In general, a system component is redundant if its service can be delivered by an-
other component in a coordinated way, without the interaction of the client(s). Ac-
cordingly, operation of redundant components presumes the existence of a coordinator
(called here redundancy manager) and some type of adjudicator. A given service is
provided by a set of redundant components called here variants, which are coordi-
nated by the redundancy manager: the service is available through the redundancy
manager and the redundant components can not be used separately. A component may
be a participant in a single redundancy structure only. Other, non-redundant compo-
nents can not be included in a redundancy structure (but the variants may use the
service of another components).
Accordingly, redundancy structures must be composed of objects instantiated from
the following types of classes: redundancy manager, variant, and adjudicator (which
can be further refined by various subtypes e.g. tester, voter or comparator).
The specific conditions of the failure of the redundancy structure (which can be
quite complex) are either available in the library of dependability-related design pat-
terns or they have to be derived by analyzing the UML diagrams describing the be-
havior of the redundancy structure.
It has to be emphasized that the construction of the structural dependability model
relies on behavioral diagrams only in the case of redundancy managers. Otherwise,
behavioral diagrams are used only in the subsequent phases to refine the structural
dependability model (Sect. 5).
3.3 Specifying Dependability Related Properties and Requirements
Basic UML focuses on capturing the complex functionality of the system but neglects
non-functional aspects such as quality of service (QoS). To allow dependability analy-
sis of designs, UML has to be extended with a notation for describing the quantitative
properties of model elements and the required properties of the system to be analyzed.
There are some ongoing activities to extend UML for dealing with such kind of
data. The OMG proposal [25] describes a general approach to classify model elements
by stereotypes and bind performance characteristics to them by using tagged values.
We followed this approach, because this annotation does not change the UML meta-
model and thus it is conformant with existing CASE tools. However, it may be incon-
venient for working with a large number of elements (some of them having identical
attributes). Because of its generality and object-oriented nature, the QoS specification
language QML [12] is a potential extension. It was adapted to quantitative model
analysis with respect to the OMG proposal in [17].
Accordingly, in our approach standard extensions of UML, i.e. stereotypes and
tagged values are used to identify the elements of redundancy structures and to assign
dependability attributes (Sect. 3.1) to components and relations.
The classes in redundancy structures, namely the redundancy manager, variant and
adjudicator are stereotyped as <<redundancy manager>>, <<variant>> and
<<adjudicator>>, respectively.
Stateless or stateful software and hardware components are stereotyped accord-
ingly. The local dependability attributes are described by tagged values as follows:
-  Fault occurrence: FO=x
-  Error latency: EL=y
-  Ratio of permanent faults: PP=v
-  Repair delay: RD=z
The designer can assign a single value (here x, y, z, v are used to instantiate the pa-
rameter), two values (range for a sensitivity analysis), or no values (the parameter
should be derived based on the parameters of underlying elements in the hierarchy).
Different sets of tagged values are assigned to different types of components accord-
ing to Table 1.
Table 1. Stereotypes and tagged values
Component type Dependability attributes Stereotypes Tagged values
Stateless hard-
ware
Fault occurrence, ratio of
permanent faults, repair
delay
<<stateless>>,
<<hardware>>
FO, PP, RD
Stateful hard-
ware
Fault occurrence, error
latency, ratio of perma-
nent faults, repair delay
<<stateful>>,
<<hardware>>
FO, EL, PP,
RD
Stateless soft-
ware
Fault occurrence <<stateless>>,
<<software>>
FO
Stateful soft-
ware
Fault occurrence, error
latency, repair delay
<<stateless>>,
<<software>>
FO, EL, RD
These stereotypes and corresponding tagged values can be applied to UML objects,
classes (in this case all objects instantiated from the class should be assigned the same
set of parameters), nodes and components.
Stereotype <<propagation>> indicates an error propagation path, with the
tagged value PP=x to assign propagation probability. This stereotype can be applied
to links between objects, associations between classes or nodes, deployment relations,
dependencies, and generalization relationships.
In order to derive the non-trivial relations in redundancy structures automatically,
further extensions are required. In statechart diagrams of the redundancy managers,
failure states are distinguished by stereotypes. Similarly, stereotypes identify the spe-
cific types of adjudicators (e.g. testers and comparators). Tagged values are used to
assign common mode fault occurrences to components. The detailed description of
these extensions can be found in [5].
4 Construction of the Dependability Model
The structural dependability model is constructed first in the form of an intermediate
model (IM)  which is a hypergraph representing the components and their relations
relevant from the point of view of the dependability analysis. In this way some peculi-
arities of UML (e.g. package hierarchy, composite objects and nodes, different types
of dependencies) can be resolved which results in a simple and flat model with a lim-
ited set of elements and relations.
4.1 The Intermediate Model (IM)
The IM is a hypergraph G=(N,A), where each node in N represents an entity, and each
hyperarc in A represents a relation between these entities. Both the nodes and the hy-
perarcs are labeled, that is they have attached a set of attributes completing their de-
scription. A generic node of the IM is described by a triple consisting of the fields
<name>, <type> and <attributes>. We now give the semantic of the interme-
diate model by describing the sets N and A and what they represent.
Nodes represent the stateful or stateless hardware/software components described
in the set of UML structural diagrams. Four types of nodes are used: SFE-SW (stateful
software), SLE-SW (stateless software), SFE-HW (stateful hardware) and SLE-HW
(stateless hardware). Attributes of the nodes characterize the fault activation and the
repair processes according to Table 1.
The fault tolerance (redundancy) structures are represented by composite nodes
FTS. The system service is represented by another specific node SYS to which the
system-level attributes (measures of interest) are assigned. It has to be emphasized that
these nodes represent the composite structures and not individual components.
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PP : Double
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Fig. 1. Metamodel of the IM
Hyperarcs among the nodes represent two kinds of relations. "Uses-the-service-of"
(U) type of hyperarc indicates an error propagation path between a server-like compo-
nent (typically a resource) and a client-like component. A U hyperarch is a one-to-one
relation directed from a node representing the client to the node representing the
server. Error propagation may occur in the opposite direction, i.e. from the server to
the client. The assigned attribute is the error propagation probability.
Another type of hyperarc represents the "is-composed-of" (C) relation in the case
of fault tolerance (redundancy) structures, i.e. FTS nodes, and system services, i.e.
SYS nodes. This type of hyperarc is a one-to-many relation directed from the FTS or
SYS node to the nodes representing the constituent parts. The hyperarc is assigned a
fault tree describing the conditions of error propagation from the parts to the compos-
ite structure.
The metamodel of the IM (in the form of class diagrams) is shown in Fig. 1.
4.2 Dependability Related Information in UML Diagrams
The dependability model is built by projecting the UML model elements into nodes,
and the UML structural relations to hyperarcs of the IM. The types of nodes are de-
termined by UML stereotypes, while the attributes are projected from tagged values of
the corresponding UML model elements (Table 1). The types of hyperarcs are deter-
mined by the stereotypes assigned to the key elements of the composite structures (i.e.
the redundancy managers).
According to the high-level approach, not only the “natural” software elements as
objects, tasks, processes etc. can be identified but also higher-level, compound ele-
ments as use cases or packages. As the UML design is hierarchical, intermediate lev-
els of the hierarchy can be represented by SYS nodes. The representation of a com-
pound UML element (like a package) depends on the level of detail described or se-
lected by the designer. If a compound UML element is not refined, or its refinement is
not relevant for the dependability analysis (as selected by the designer) then it is rep-
resented by a simple software or hardware node in the IM. If it is refined and its re-
finement is relevant then its subcomponents are represented as simple nodes and the
compound as a whole is represented by a SYS node. In the case of hyperarcs, all po-
tential propagation paths are taken into account thus the structure of the model repre-
sents worst-case error propagation. The fine-tuning is left to the actual parameter as-
signment.
Now we summarize the role UML diagrams and elements considered in our model
derivation. As already stated, we focus on the structural UML diagrams to construct
the dependability model. Nevertheless, it may be necessary to use also behavioral dia-
grams for a more detailed modeling of redundancy structures.
-  Use case diagrams identify actors and top-level services of the system (this way
also identify the system level failure).
-  Class diagrams are used to identify relations (associations) that are traced to ob-
jects. By default, each class is instantiated by a single object.
-  Object, collaboration and sequence diagrams are used to identify objects (as basic
components) and their relations. Messages identify the direction of the relations.
-  Component diagrams are used to identify the relations among components, and in
this way among objects realized by the components. Note that the components are
instantiated on the deployment diagrams.
-  Deployment diagrams are used to identify hardware elements and deployed-on (a
specific case of "uses-the-service-of") relations among software and hardware ele-
ments. Relations among hardware elements (e.g. communication) are also de-
scribed here.
-  Statechart diagrams are used basically only in the case of redundancy structures, to
derive the non-trivial relations among participants of the structure.
In the following we sketch the projection in the case of object and class diagrams.
Other projections are described in [5].
4.3 Projection of the Model Elements of Object and Class Diagrams
Object diagrams (and also collaboration diagrams) include instances that are repre-
sented by nodes in the IM. Simple objects are projected into simple nodes of the IM.
Composite objects are projected into a set of nodes, with unidirectional error propa-
gation paths from the sub-objects to the composite one.
Since each object is a particular instance of a class, the relations of objects and
their type information can be deduced by the analysis of the class diagrams. Model
elements of class diagrams are utilized as follows.
Inheritance hierarchy of classes is utilized to identify the relationships: if an object
is instantiated from a given class then the relationships of this class and also of its an-
cestors have to be taken into account.
Associations are binary or n-ary relations among classes. In general, associations
mean that the objects instantiated from the corresponding classes know (i.e. can name)
each other. Associations may be instantiated by links on object and collaboration dia-
grams, and communication among objects is possible along these links. Accordingly,
an association indicates a potential bi-directional error propagation path among these
objects thus it is projected into the IM. The following additional features might be
taken into account.
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Fig. 3. Projection of the UML  object diagram in Fig. 2. into the IM
-  Navigability of an association end denotes whether the instance can be directly
reached. However, it does not give precise information about the direction of the
potential error propagation, since through return values also a unidirectional navi-
gation may result in bi-directional error propagation. Accordingly, each association
is projected by default to bi-directional error propagation.
-  Or-associations (indicating a situation when only one of several possible associa-
tions may be valid) are all projected into the IM, in this way a worst case depend-
ability model is constructed.
-  Multiplicity of association ends are taken into account only when the classes are
not instantiated on object diagrams. Indeed, in the early phases of the design the in-
stantiation of the model may not be available. It might be useful for the designer to
have a default instantiation in order to compute rough dependability measures. Ac-
cordingly, if a class has multiplicity specification then the value or the lower bound
of its range can be taken into account. If it is missing or equal to zero then by de-
fault a single instance is taken into account. Metaclasses, type classes and param-
eterized classes (i.e. templates) are not instantiated.
-  Aggregation (composition) is projected into a unidirectional error propagation
path: the aggregate (composite, respectively) uses the service of the aggregated
elements.
-  Unary associations (both ends attached to the same class) denote associations
among objects of the same class. According to the structural (worst case) approach,
they are projected into the IM denoting error propagation paths from each object to
each other. Reflexive paths are not considered. N-ary associations are projected
into the IM as a set of binary associations, where each possible pair of classes in-
cluded in the n-ary form is taken into account.
-  Association classes are handled as separate classes having associations with the
classes at the endpoints of the association.
Generalization is the relationship between a more general element (class) and a
more specific one. Generalization does not indicate an error propagation path, thus it
is not projected into the IM (but the inheritance of relations defined by generalizations
is taken into account).
Dependency means a semantic relationship between classes. From the point of view
of dependability modeling, those dependencies are relevant which relate also the in-
stances (not only the classes themselves, like <<refine>> or <<trace>> relation-
ships). This way in the set of the predefined types of dependencies, only the
<<uses>> dependency (meaning that an element requires the presence of another
element for its correct functioning) indicates an error propagation path, thus it is pro-
jected into the IM.
An example of an object diagram of a production cell (described in [6]) and the
corresponding IM are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. Note that the objects Press1HW,
Press2HW and RedundancyManager form a redundancy structure (Sect. 4.5). The
external actor in Fig. 2 identifies the top level components providing the system serv-
ice (Sect. 4.6).
4.4 Projection of Resource Usage
UML deployment diagrams show instances of hardware components (nodes) and the
configuration of run-time components on them.
-  Nodes are run-time physical objects, usually hardware resources. They are pro-
jected into hardware nodes in the IM.
-  Objects realized by components are projected into software nodes of the IM.
-  UML components represent pieces of run-time software. If a component is refined,
i.e. the set of objects realized by the component is given then the component is not
projected into a separate software node of the IM. If a component is not refined
then it is projected into a single software node of the IM.
-  Deployment relations among nodes and components and realization relations
among components and objects (both shown by graphical nesting or composition
associations) indicate potential error propagation paths with direction from the
nodes to the objects. They are projected into the IM.
Note that the conventions introduced in the General Resource Model (GRM [25])
enable a more refined modeling of resource usage than in the case of deployment dia-
grams (see Sect. 5).
4.5 Projection of Redundancy
A redundancy structure (identified by the redundancy manager, Fig. 4) is projected
into an FTS node of the IM connected, by using a C hyperarc, to the elements repre-
senting the redundancy manager, the adjudicators, and the variants.
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Fig. 4. Projection of a simple redundancy structure
In simple cases the error propagation is described by a fault tree. The construction
of a fault tree corresponding to a redundancy structure (not included in the library of
schemes) requires the analysis of the behavior, i.e. the statechart diagram, of the re-
dundancy manager. This kind of analysis is supported by the designer, as he/she iden-
tifies (by stereotyping) the failure states and events in the statechart. The fault tree is
constructed by a reachability analysis enumerating the paths in the statechart that can
lead to failure states (i.e. failure of the redundancy structure) [5]. The incoming events
on these paths identify the failures of variants and/or adjudicators that are considered
as basic events in the fault tree. Repair is taken into account in a default way by using
the dual counterpart of the fault tree.
In the case of sophisticated recovery and repair policies, the statechart of the re-
dundancy manager is transformed directly to a TPN subnet (Sect. 5.1). This approach
results in a more complex model but allows the analysis of non-trivial scenarios and
temporal dependencies.
4.6 Mapping from Architectural to Service Level
In UML, the services of the system are identified on use case diagrams. Model ele-
ments of these diagrams include actors, use cases, communication associations among
actors and use cases, and generalizations among use cases.
-  A use case represents a coherent functionality of the system. Usually, each use case
is refined by interactions of objects. However, it may happen that in the early
phases of the design only some (important or critical) use cases are refined, the oth-
ers are not. Accordingly, if a use case is not refined or the refinement is not rele-
vant then it is projected into a simple IM node, otherwise it is projected into a SYS
node of the IM, which relates the nodes resulting from the projection of the other
UML diagrams belonging to this use case.
-  Actors represent (roles of) users or entities that interact directly with the system.
Being external entities from the point of view of a given service, actors are not
projected into the IM.
-  Communication associations among actors and use cases identify the services of
the system. If a use case is connected directly to external actor(s) then it is pro-
jected into a top-level SYS node of the IM. Usually, a real system is composed of
several use cases, more of them being connected directly to actors. Dependability
measures of such use cases can be computed separately, by a set of dependability
models assigned to each use case. However, all services of the system can also be
composed in a single dependability model, computing the measures corresponding
to multiple SYS nodes.
-  Relationships among use cases are represented in UML by generalizations with
stereotype <<extend>> and <<include>>.  Extend relationships mean that a
use case augments the behavior implemented by another one. It indicates an error
propagation path in the direction of the relationship, thus it is projected into the IM.
Include relationships mean a containment relation thus they will be projected (in
the reverse direction) similarly into error propagation paths.
4.7 Construction of the Analysis Model
On the basis of the IM a second step of the transformation builds a TPN dependability
model, by generating a subnet for each model element of the IM [5].
A TPN model is composed of a set of elements as listed in Table 2. Places, transi-
tions and subnets all have a name, which is local to the subnet where they are defined.
Transitions are described by a random variable (specifying the distribution of the de-
lay necessary to perform the associated activity) and a memory policy field (a rule for
the sampling of the successive random delays from the distribution). A transition has a
guard, that is a Boolean function of the net marking, and a priority used to solve the
conflict. The weights on input and output arcs may be dependent from the marking of
the net. Subnets are a convenient modeling notation to encapsulate portion of the
whole net, thus allowing for a modular and hierarchical definition of the model.
Table 2. Elements of the TPN model
Element Description
Place <name> <initial tokens>
Transition <name> <random variable> <memory policy> <guard>
<priority>
Input arc <from place> <to transition> <weight>
Output arc <from transition> <to place> <weight>
Subnet Nested TPN sub-model
Notice that the class of TPNs defined here is quite general. If the TPN model con-
tains only instantaneous and exponential transitions, then it is a GSPN that can be eas-
ily translated into the specific notation of the automated tools able to solve it [8,10]. If
deterministic transitions are included as well, then the model is a DSPN, which under
certain conditions can be analytically solved with specific tools like UltraSAN, and
TimeNET. If other kinds of distributions of the transition firing times are included,
then simulation can be used to solve the TPN model.
We take advantage from the modularity of the TPN models defined above, to build
the whole model as a collection of subnets, linked by input and output arcs over inter-
face places. For each node of the hypergraph, one or two subnets are generated, de-
pending from node type. The basic subnets represent the internal state of each element
appearing in the IM, and model the failure and repair processes.
Fault Activation Subnets. The fault activation subnets (called basic subnets
hereafter) include a set of places and transitions that are also interfaces towards other
subnets of the model. Places called H and F model the healthy and failed state of the
component represented by the IM node (Fig. 5). Fault activation subnets of stateful
elements also include place E to represent the erroneous state of the component. For a
stateless node, transition fault models the occurrence of a fault and the consequent
failure of the node. For a stateful node, the occurrence of a fault generates first a
corrupted internal state (error), modeled by the introduction of a token in E. After a
latency period, modeled by transition latency, this error brings to the failure.
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STATELESSSubnet <node_name>_fail
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[m(E)=1]
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fault
Subnet <node_name>_fail
Fig. 5. Fault activation subnets for stateless and stateful nodes
For each FTS and SYS node, a basic failure subnet containing only two interface
places, namely H and F, is generated in the TPN model. Indeed, FTS and SYS nodes
represent composite elements, and their internal evolution is modeled through the
subnets of their composing elements.
Propagation Subnets. By examining the U hyperarcs of the IM, the transformation
generates a set of propagation subnets, which link the basic subnets. For instance,
suppose node A is linked by a U hyperarc to node B in the IM. In this case, we want to
model the fact that a failure occurred in the server B may propagate to the client A,
corrupting its internal state. The propagation subnet B->A shown in Fig. 6 models this
phenomenon (immediate transitions are depicted by thin bars).
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Fig. 6. Error propagation from node B to node A
The propagation subnet becomes enabled only after element B has failed. At that
time, a token is put into place B.F, and the propagation subnet is activated. The subnet
moves with probability p the token being in place A.H to place A.E. This models the
introduction of an error in element A. A single token circulates among the two places
New and Used, to allow the propagation subnet to be activated only once for each
failure of B (t1 cannot fire until a token is moved from place Used to New).
Consider now a type C hyperarc, linking a FTS node P with its composing nodes.
The fault-tree associated with the arc expresses the logic with which the failures of the
composing elements propagate towards the failure of P. Also, the dual of the fault-tree
(obtained by exchanging each AND gate with an OR gate and vice versa) represents
the way the composed element P gets repaired when the composing element are re-
covered. Thus, the fault-tree is translated into a failure propagation subnet, and its
dual counterpart is translated into a "repair propagation" subnet. These two subnets
are linked to the basic subnets of all the elements connected by the C hyperarc. Note
that the Boolean conditions of the fault trees can be represented in Petri nets either by
enabling conditions of transitions or by explicit subnets corresponding to AND or OR
gates [5].
Repair Subnets. The repair subnet of a node is activated by the failure occurred in the
fault activation subnet of the same node. For instance, Fig. 7 shows the repair subnets
for stateless and stateful hardware nodes. The two transitions implicit and
explicit represent the two different kinds of repair which are needed as a
consequence of a transient and permanent hardware fault, respectively. If the node is
stateless then the final effect of the repair is the insertion of a token in place H. If it is
stateful then the repair also removes a token from place E, modeling the error
recovery activity.
Notice that all the parameters needed to define the subnets are found in the IM in
the obvious fields.
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Fig. 7.  Repair subnets of hardware nodes
Subnets for Mapping from Architecture to Service Level. C hyperarcs linking SYS
nodes are handled in the same way like C hyperarcs linking FTS nodes. When a SYS
node does not have an associated fault tree, then we implicitly associate to it a simple
fault tree representing the OR relation of all the composing elements.
The markings of places H and F for the SYS node at the top level of the IM define
a partition between proper and improper service: whenever a token reaches place F,
the service (the object of the dependability evaluation) is considered as failed. Ac-
cordingly, the solution of the dependability model should provide the average number
of tokens in H to get asymptotic availability figures and the time of the first occur-
rence of a token in F to get reliability figures.
5 Refinement of the Dependability Model
We identified and elaborated the following options to perform refinement in the
structural dependability model as the UML model becomes more detailed:
-  Mapping the behavioral diagrams describing redundancy management directly to
TPN subnets.
-  Constructing subnets on the basis of the refined modeling of usage and fault activa-
tion in the used resources.
These options will be described in the following sections.
5.1 Refined Modeling of Redundancy Management
The behavioral diagrams describing redundancy and resource management are natural
candidates to be used during refinement since they describe the core logic of the de-
pendability model. In Sect. 4, fault trees were constructed on the basis of the statechart
diagram of the redundancy manager in a class based redundancy scheme. The fault
tree representing logic conditions (as a static snapshot) can be integrated with the fault
activation and repair subnets by using the Petri net places E, F and H representing the
state of the components. However, in this way sophisticated repair/recovery scenarios
and temporal dependencies could not be taken into account.
In the refinement step, also the dynamics of replica management (sequence of fail-
ure events and repair actions) can be considered. Statecharts of selected objects are
mapped directly to Petri nets by a model transformation that preserves the dynamic
semantics of the statechart [15]. This way the designer is allowed to use the full power
of statecharts (state hierarchy, concurrency etc.) to describe application-dependent
replication and recovery strategies. It has to be emphasized that only the statecharts of
the objects responsible for replica management and recovery are considered in this
refinement step. They are interfaced with the other parts of the system by events de-
scribing failure occurrences (error reports), and actions initiating repairs. Accordingly,
instead of using the places corresponding to the states of the components (as in the
case of fault trees), the integration of the resulting subnets requires additional TPN
places representing the changes in the system as follows:
-  Input places of the refined subnets represent events. By default, the basic subnet
responsible for fault activation puts a token into the place representing the corre-
sponding failure event when it occurs (i.e. state changes from H to F). In a further
refinement step, more precise error detection and coverage can also be modeled
(similarly by statecharts).
-  Output places of the refined subnets represent actions. The subnet belonging to the
statechart puts a token into a place representing a repair action when it is generated.
By default, this action triggers a TPN transition corresponding to the explicit repair
in the component (i.e. target of the action) affected by the repair. Again, based on
this interface the repair actions can be refined in subsequent steps.
This approach was introduced first in [16] and adapted to the fault tolerance infra-
structure defined by FT-CORBA [23] in [21]. In this adaptation, first a high-level de-
pendability model is constructed that allows the analysis of the fault tolerance strate-
gies and properties directly supported by the standard infrastructure. In the refinement
step, the detailed behavioral model, i.e. the UML statechart of the Replication Man-
ager is transformed to a TPN. This subnet forms the core of the dependability model
by replacing the original, generic subnet. In this way the analysis of application-
dependent, specific replication strategies and recovery policies can be supported.
5.2 Rationale of the Refined Fault Modeling
The modeling and analysis methodology described in Sect. 4 is able to deliver a first,
system-level estimate of the dependability attributes based on aggregate measures, like
fault occurrence and error propagation rates. However, as error propagation depends
both on the attributes of the corresponding components and on the workload distribu-
tion in the system, a more refined model in the later phases of the design process
should reflect these factors separately.
Frequently, a timeliness and/or performance analysis is performed on the system
prior to dependability evaluation, especially if the system has to satisfy severe tempo-
ral constraints. We sketch here a dependability modeling style which can reuse the
models constructed for performance analysis.
The main scope of the refined methodology is the modeling of the effects of per-
manent and transient operational faults in resources, dominantly implemented in
hardware, and the propagation of errors via hardware, software components, and mes-
sages, respectively. A crucial problem results from structure altering faults and error
propagation effects not included in a functional model of the system. For instance, two
functionally independent threads sharing a resource may interact through a parasitic
coupling if a fault affects this resource. (The theoretical background would even allow
for modeling faults in the very computer core, like the CPU-memory setup. However,
such a fine granular modeling is practically infeasible due to the complexity of the
model.) Fortunately, each critical application has some well-defined damage confine-
ment regions designed to limit the propagation of errors within them. Accordingly, an
appropriate modeling style assures a proper handling of structure altering faults. The
main rule is to describe explicitly all the resource sharing within of a damage con-
finement region. Direct computational faults are restricted in our model to transient
faults local to components, and redundancy-based solutions are modeled explicitly.
5.3 The General Resource Model (GRM)
OMG did elaborate the General Resource Model (GRM [25]), providing a standard-
ized notation to describe resource types, their static or dynamic interaction with the
system, together with their management. The services required from and delivered by
the resources are characterized by means of QoS parameters defined according to the
actual analysis objective. GRM is a (sub)profile defined for transformation based
analysis. The standard profile offers several notations to describe schedulability, per-
formance, and time. GRM can be extended for several analysis objectives, including
dependability assessment.
For the sake of completeness, we shortly summarize  the main concepts of GRM
(Fig. 8).
In case of static resource usage modeling the dynamics of the client-server interac-
tion is neglected, and only a comparison of the QoS values required by the client and
offered by the resource instance is performed. A typical system level static quantita-
tive QoS analysis task is a worst case assessment of the sufficiency of the total capac-
ity offered by the resources matched against the total of the requests.
Dynamic usage modeling explicitly describes the order and timing of the client-
resource interaction steps. A resource instance may offer multiple different kinds of
services. Each kind of a service use is represented by a scenario, a temporally ordered
series of action executions, as steps using specific service(s) offered by a resource.
QoS values are assigned to the service invocations (required QoS value), and to the
resource service instances (offered QoS).
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Fig. 8.  The OMG General Resource Model
Resources can be classified according to the protection kind used either as unpro-
tected or protected. The latter offers services to be used simultaneously only by a sin-
gle client under an access control policy administered by a resource broker. A re-
source manager supervises the creation and administration of (typically software)
resources according to a resource control policy. GRM introduces further technical
classifications on resources, like by purpose (processor, communication resource, or
device), or by activeness (whether they require a trigger or not).
5.4 Modeling of Fault Occurrences
A GRM-based model, as a starting point describes the logic of interactions between
the application and the underlying platform. The initial structure of this model is fre-
quently the byproduct of the previous performance analysis. However, dependability
analysis necessitates the simultaneous tracing of the information flow in the fault-free
and in a faulty case (or all candidate faulty cases) of the system in order to estimate
the probabilities of the observable difference in their behavior.
This way the interaction model has to be extended in order to cover all the antici-
pated faulty cases. This is done by qualitative fault modeling. This uninterpreted type
of modeling uses a small set of qualitative values from an enumerated type, like
{good, faulty, illegal} to construct an abstract model reflecting the state of the re-
sources and the potential propagation of errors through the system via invocations and
messages. The value of illegal serves here to model the fault effects resulting in a
violation of functional constraints. For instance, a data may not conform to a type re-
lated restriction due to a memory fault forcing it out of the legal range or catastrophic
distortions of the control flow may cause a crash. The designer can select the set of
qualitative values arbitrarily, according to the aim of the analysis. For instance values
of early and late can extend the domain of qualitative values for timeliness analysis in
the potentially faulty case.
Stateful components in the system, like resources can take their actual state from
this domain of qualitative values. They change the state upon internal fault activation,
repair and error propagation.
-  Temporal and permanent operational faults in the resources originate in external
effects occurring independently from the processes internal to the system.  The ap-
pearance of the selected fault or fault mode (in case if a resource can be affected by
different kinds of faults) at the fault site is triggered by a separate fault activation
process independently of the internal functioning of the system (Fig. 9). The fault
activation process has a direct access to the resources in order to activate the se-
lected fault(s) by forcing a transition of the state of the component to faulty. Fre-
quently, fault activation is restricted, for instance by a single fault assumption. All
these restrictions can be included into the fault activation process.
-  External repair actions can be included into the model as independent processes,
as well. Built-in automated recovery actions can be modeled as special service in-
vocations forcing the state of the resource to good.
Rates can be associated to steps of fault activation and repair processes as QoS val-
ues. Their rule is identical to that in the corresponding TPN subnets described in Sect.
4. The changes of fault states in resources are reflected in the activation of different
scenarios for service invocations.
5.5 Modeling of Propagation
The propagation of faulty and illegal values in the scenarios of dynamic usage models
(i.e. in message sequence charts or statecharts) represents error propagation during an
interaction between a component and resource.
Usage scenarios have to be extended by including fault states as branch conditions
if the interaction potentially exposes different behaviors on good and faulty data or
resource states. Usually this extension transforms the scenarios to non-deterministic
ones, for instance to express probabilistic error manifestation. The arrival of a faulty
input data to a stateful resource or component may trigger a good to faulty transition.
Similarly, the invocation of a faulty component may result in a faulty output delivered
by the service.
Quantitative measures can be associated to the different scenarios, including the in-
put request arrival frequencies (rates) of the different kinds of data, probabilities as-
signed to the non-deterministic branches.
Please note, that the main benefit of using this detailed model is that the quantita-
tive dependability model is cleanly decomposed into the workload model (rate of
service invocation), activation and repair (separate processes), and error manifestation
(interaction scenarios).
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Fig. 9.  The fault modeling architecture according to the GRM
The model transformation technology that maps fault activation and usage scenar-
ios to dependability sub-models is the message sequence chart and statechart to TPN
transformation introduced in Sect. 5.1 [15].
6 Implementation of the Model Transformation
In HIDE the enriched UML model of the target design was transformed to the mathe-
matical model (TPN for dependability evaluation) by a custom-built model transfor-
mation. Later, to avoid the impreciseness of an ad-hoc implementation, the mathe-
matically precise paradigm of graph transformations was selected as the foundation of
the definition and implementation of the model transformation. A general framework
called VIATRA (Visual Automated model TRAnsformations [11]) was worked out
that is also flexible enough to cover the changing UML standard.
In VIATRA, both the UML dialect (standard base UML and its profiles, on one
hand restricted by modeling conventions and on the other hand enriched by depend-
ability requirements and local dependability attributes) and the target mathematical
notation are specified in the form of UML class diagrams [32] following the concepts
of MOF metamodeling [24]. Metamodels are interpreted as type graphs (typed, attrib-
uted and directed graphs) and models are valid instances of their type graphs [33]. The
transformation steps are specified by graph transformation rules in the form of a 3-
tuple (LHS, N, RHS) where LHS is the left-hand side graph, RHS is the right-hand
side graph and N is an optional negative application condition. The application of the
rule rewrites the initial model by replacing the pattern defined by LHS with the pattern
of the RHS. Fig. 10 shows, for example, how an UML object of a class stereotyped as
"stateful hardware" becomes an IM node of type SFE_HW with the same name (the
source and target objects are linked together by a reference node in the figure). The
operational semantics of the transformation (i.e. the sequence of rules to be applied) is
given by a control flow graph. As both LHS and RHS can be specified visually (in the
form of UML class diagrams), we have an expressive and easy-to-understand notation
for the transformation designer.
In the case of dependability modeling, VIATRA is applied to the UML dialect de-
scribed in Sect. 3 in order to generate first the IM model according to the metamodel
given in Fig. 1 then (in a second step) the TPN model itself. The generic TPN de-
scription is then tailored to the input language of the selected tool by a minor post-
processing step. The first step of the model transformation from the point of view of
the transformation designer is depicted in Fig. 11.
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Fig. 10.  Definition of a simple transformation rule
The modeler does not have to deal with these internal representations, since the ex-
ecutable program generated from the rules will perform the transformation automati-
cally [32]. The general technological concept of VIATRA is the use of the XMI stan-
dard (for arbitrary MOF-based metamodel). Accordingly, the UML CASE tool is in-
terfaced with the transformator by utilizing its XMI export facility. The output of the
transformation is again in XMI format, thus the final syntax tailoring steps can be per-
formed by XSLT or dedicated programs.
The first step of our model transformation (from UML structural diagrams to the
IM) was defined by only slightly more than 50 rules (e.g. the processing of class dia-
grams required 28 rules). The subsequent step of constructing the various modules of
the TPN can be performed either by similar graph transformation rules or by a Java
program  [28].
VIATRA is used to construct the fault trees from the statechart diagrams of the re-
dundancy managers as well. Moreover, the generic transformation from UML state-
charts to TPN was also developed in this framework.
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Fig. 11.  Application of VIATRA in the first transformation step
7 Assessment of the Approach
The input of the dependability analysis is the set of UML structural diagrams. These
diagrams were enriched to allow the designer to identify redundancy structures and
provide the parameters needed for the definition of the dependability model. The ex-
tensions adhere to standard UML and to the OMG GRM profile. The restrictions im-
posed on the designer concern only the modeling of redundancy structures. The class
based redundancy approach correlates with the usual architecture of distributed fault
tolerant object-oriented systems (e.g. Fault Tolerant CORBA [23]).
The semantic correctness of the dependability model relies on the abstraction rep-
resented by the IM. In the IM, each element is assigned an internal fault activation and
repair process, while relations specify the way for the propagation of failure and repair
events. These local effects are represented in the TPN by separate subnets that can be
checked formally (contrary to the above UML diagrams, TPN has formal semantics).
The number of model elements in the transformation is in the same order of mag-
nitude as the number of model elements in the UML design. This statement derives
from the projection defined when the IM is constructed, since the TPN subnets be-
longing to IM elements have a fixed number of model elements. A hand-made model
could save on the number of modeling elements at the expenses of the modularity.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we described a transformation from structural UML diagrams to TPN
models for the quantitative evaluation of availability and reliability. Our transforma-
tion is an attempt to build first a quite abstract system-level dependability model with
tractable dimensions that can be subsequently enriched and refined by substituting
coarse representation of some elements with a more detailed one.
We identified two points in the model where the refined sub-models can be ac-
quired: both the behavioral diagrams describing redundancy and the resource usage
(based on the GRM) are candidates of model transformations that result in refined
sub-models to be included in the dependability model.
Besides the structural dependability modeling of the production cell benchmark [6],
we successfully applied the model refinement approach in the case of FT-CORBA
architectures [21].
In addition, further work is ongoing to refine the methodologies described here and
to collect evidence on the feasibility and usefulness of the approach. This work is per-
formed in the frame of the PRIDE project, supported by the Italian Space Agency,
where the transformation described in this paper  is being implemented as a part of the
'HRT UML Nice' toolset specifically tailored for the design and validation of real-time
dependable systems.
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